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Andrew Summers, LSE (a.d.summers@lse.ac.uk)∗ 
Judges often invoke ‘common sense’ when deciding questions of legal causation. I draw on recent 
work in experimental psychology to refine the commonsense theory of legal causation developed 
by Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law. I show that the two main principles of abnormality 
and choice that Hart and Honoré identified are empirically well-founded; I also show how 
experimental studies into causal selection can be used to specify these principles with greater 
precision than before. This approach can help provide legal scholars with a plausible new set of 
hypotheses to use in re-examining the decided cases on legal causation. If correct, the new 
commonsense theory that I develop has important implications not only for debates within legal 
scholarship, but also for judicial practice on issues of legal causation in criminal and private law. 
Keywords: causation; common sense; legal causation; causal selection; experimental 
psychology; Hart and Honoré 
1. Introduction	
In both criminal and private law, judges often invoke ‘common sense’ when deciding questions 
of causation. As Lord Wright put it, ‘This choice of the real or efficient cause from out of the 
whole complex of the facts must be made by applying commonsense standards. Causation is to 
be understood as the man in the street, and not as either the scientist or the metaphysician, 
would understand it.’1 Commonsense reasoning is most prevalent in questions of legal 
causation,2 where the court must determine whether the defendant’s liability was negated by an 
                                                             
∗ I am very grateful to Tatiana Cutts, Nicholas McBride and Fred Wilmot-Smith for many helpful 
suggestions on earlier drafts. Special thanks are due to Tobias Gerstenberg, Assistant Professor in 
Cognitive Psychology at the Causality in Cognition Lab at Stanford University, for his detailed comments 
on several drafts. Any errors in this article remain my own. 
1 Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co Ltd v Minister of War Transport [1942] AC 691 (HL) 706. 
2 Also referred to as ‘intervening’, ‘supervening’ or ‘proximate’ causation, or ‘scope of liability’. 




intervening event even though their conduct remained a but-for cause of the harm. In this 
context, ‘common sense’ appears to signpost a judicial attempt to incorporate into legal 
decision-making the way in which ordinary people make causal judgements outside the law. 
Legal scholars have been divided in their approach to this type of judicial reasoning. 
The dominant approach has been to deny that decisions on legal causation have anything to do 
with common sense: such references are mistaken, or deliberately obscure the judges’ real 
reasons; instead, legal causation turns exclusively on issues of ‘legal policy’, such as the scope 
and purpose of the relevant rule. Stapleton and Wright are the foremost proponents of this 
view, which has become widely accepted.3 In Causation in the Law, Hart and Honoré took a 
different approach.4 They considered that decisions on legal causation may really be based on 
common sense, meaning principles that affect ordinary people’s causal judgements outside the 
law. On this approach, the first task for legal scholars is to specify what these commonsense 
principles are; only then can we examine whether or not they are also evident in the cases on 
legal causation. However, since Hart and Honoré’s initial attempt, this approach has largely 
fallen out of favour within contemporary legal scholarship. 
In this article I revive Hart and Honoré’s approach, but I adopt a new method for identifying the 
principles that affect ordinary people’s causal judgements outside the law. I argue that legal 
scholars have been premature to dismiss all judicial references to common sense as nothing 
more than an ‘empty slogan’;5 Hart and Honoré were right to consider this ‘a counsel of despair 
which we should hesitate to accept’.6 But whereas Hart and Honoré sought to identify 
commonsense principles using only their own intuitions about the use of ordinary language, I 
                                                             
3 Wright, ‘Causation in Tort Law’ (1985) 73 California Law Review 1735; Wright, ‘Once More into the 
Bramble Bush: Duty, Causal Contribution, and the Extent of Legal Responsibility’ (2001) 54 Vanderbilt 
Law Review 1071; Stapleton, ‘Cause in Fact and the Scope of Liability for Consequences’ (2003) 119 LQR 
388; Stapleton, ‘Choosing what we mean by "Causation" in the Law’ (2008) 73 Missouri Law Review 433. 
4 Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law (2nd edn, Clarendon 1985) (hereafter ‘Hart and Honoré). 
5 Stapleton, ‘Reflections on Common Sense Causation in Australia’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman 
(eds), Torts in Commercial Law (Thomson Reuters 2011), 331. See further text to n20 below. 
6 Hart and Honoré 26. 




draw instead on empirical evidence from experimental psychology to specify these principles 
more reliably and with greater precision than before. Given that judges so often insist that their 
decisions on legal causation are based on common sense, this research provides a plausible new 
set of hypotheses for legal scholars to use in re-examining the case law. 
The article proceeds in three parts. In part one, I highlight the prevalence of commonsense 
reasoning in judicial decisions on legal causation; then, I outline Hart and Honoré’s explanation 
of this reasoning and evaluate the main criticisms of their theory. In part two, I develop a new 
commonsense theory that draws on empirical evidence to refine the two main commonsense 
principles of abnormality and choice that Hart and Honoré identified. In part three, I show why 
it matters if this theory is correct, not only for the shape and content of scholarly debates about 
legal causation, but also for judicial practice. 
2. Hart	and	Honoré’s	Theory	
Judges often say that questions of legal causation are a matter of ‘common sense’, but then fail to 
identify any of the specific factors or principles influencing their decision. Legal scholars have, 
understandably, criticised this judicial practice. In this part, I outline Hart and Honoré’s attempt 
to specify the commonsense principles of causal reasoning that might affect judicial decisions on 
legal causation. I also evaluate the leading criticisms of Hart and Honoré’s theory, which can be 
divided into three main strands: criticisms of their linguistic analysis and the commonsense 
principles that they identified using this method; criticisms of their legal analysis, in particular 
the consistency of the case law with the commonsense principles that they had identified; and 
finally, two misplaced criticisms that in my view mistake the purpose, or at least the surviving 
contribution, of their theory. 





To establish liability in criminal or private law, it must usually be shown that the relevant harm 
would not have occurred ‘but for’ the defendant’s wrongful conduct.7 It must also be shown that 
there were no intervening events – such as the claimant’s own conduct, the conduct of a third 
party, or a natural event – that negated the defendant’s liability. These two stages of legal 
liability are often referred to as ‘factual’ and ‘legal’ causation respectively.8 Legal scholars have 
sometimes questioned whether these stages are appropriately labelled, and whether they are 
substantively distinct;9 nevertheless, most textbooks and judicial decisions continue to treat 
them separately.10 In this article I focus exclusively on the latter (legal causation) stage; this is 
also the stage where judicial references to common sense are most prevalent. 
Several House of Lords decisions have expressly endorsed a ‘common sense’ approach to 
questions of legal causation.11 As Lord Reid put it in Stapley v Gypsum Mines: 
To determine what caused an accident from the point of view of legal liability is a 
most difficult task. If there is any valid logical or scientific theory of causation it is 
quite irrelevant in this connection … The question must be determined by applying 
common sense to the facts of each particular case.12 
                                                             
7 There are some established exceptions to this requirement (for example, problems of 
overdetermination, pre-emption or evidential gaps); however, the but-for test remains at the core of most 
legal inquiries: see further Green, Causation in Negligence (Hart Publishing 2015) ch2. 
8 In experimental psychology, these two stages may instead be referred to as tests of ‘causal involvement’ 
and ‘causal selection’, respectively; see further text to n98 below. 
9 eg Broadbent, ‘Fact and Law in the Causal Inquiry’ (2009) 17 Legal Theory 173; Hamer, ‘"Factual 
Causation" and "Scope of Liability": What's the difference?’ (2014) 77 MLR 155. 
10 eg R v Hughes [2013] UKSC 56, [2013] 1 WLR 2461 [23] (Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson), referring to 
‘the distinction between “cause” in the sense of a sine qua non without which the consequence would not 
have occurred, and “cause” in the sense of something which was a legally effective cause of that 
consequence.’ 
11 Leyland Shipping Co Ltd v Norwich Union Fire Insurance Society Ltd [1918] AC 350 (HL) 363 (Lord 
Dunedin); Hogan v Bentinck West Hartley Collieries [1949] 1 All ER 588 (HL) 596 (Lord Normand); 
Alphacell Ltd v Woodward [1972] AC 824 (HL) 834 (Lord Wilberforce), 837 (Lord Salmon); Smith New 
Court Securities Ltd v Citibank NA [1997] AC 254 (HL) 285 (Lord Steyn); Reeves v Commissioner of Police of 
the Metropolis [2000] 1 AC 360 (HL) 391 (Lord Hobhouse). 
12 Stapley v Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] AC 663 (HL) 781 (Lord Reid). 




More recently, in R v Hughes, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson held that ‘there is a well-
recognised distinction between conduct which sets the stage for an occurrence and conduct 
which on a common sense view is regarded as instrumental in bringing about the occurrence’.13 
Judges have expressly disclaimed any ‘philosophical’14 or ‘scientific’15 notion of causation that 
would preclude selection between but-for causes.16 Instead, judges have often stated that in 
deciding questions of legal causation, their aim is to emulate ‘ordinary everyday life and 
thoughts and expressions’,17 ‘ordinary practical affairs’,18 and the views of ‘the man in the 
street’.19 Accordingly, in the context of legal causation, ‘common sense’ appears (at least 
provisionally) to signpost a judicial attempt to incorporate into legal reasoning the way in which 
ordinary people make causal judgements outside the law. 
Commonsense reasoning has persisted in judicial decisions on legal causation despite extensive 
academic criticism. These criticisms are traceable to the work of the early American legal 
realists, who argued that the ‘real’ reasons for legal decisions were often contrary to the judges’ 
express (‘common sense’) reasoning.20 More recently, Stapleton has described judicial 
                                                             
13 R v Hughes (n10) [23] (emphasis added). See also Galoo Ltd v Bright Grahame Murray [1994] 1 WLR 
1360 (CA) 1374-1375 (Glidewell LJ). 
14 Yorkshire Dale Steamship (n1) 702 (Lord Macmillan). See also Monarch Steamship Co Ltd v Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker [1949] AC 196 (HL) (n17) 228 (Lord Wright), rejecting ‘philosophic speculation’; Alphacell 
(n11) 847 (Lord Salmon), rejecting ‘abstract metaphysical theory’. 
15 Weld-Blundell v Stephens [1920] AC 956 (HL) 986 (Lord Sumner), rejecting ‘scientific inquests’; Stapley 
(n12) 681 (Lord Reid), rejecting ‘logical or scientific theory’; Grant v Sun Shipping Co Ltd [1948] AC 549 
(HL) 564 (Lord Du Parcq), rejecting ‘the language of logicians’. 
16 eg Mill, A System of Logic: Raciocentive and Inductive (Longmans 1843) 360-361: ‘[Although] it is very 
common to single out one only of the antecedents under the denomination of cause, calling the others 
mere conditions … The real cause, is the whole of these antecedents; and we have, philosophically 
speaking, no right to give the name of cause to one of them, exclusively of the others.’ See also Hume, A 
Treatise of Human Nature (London 1739) 171; Lewis, Counterfactuals (Blackwell 1973) 558-559. 
17 Monarch 228 (Lord Wright). 
18 Hogan (n11) 595 (Lord Normand). 
19 Yorkshire Dale Steamship 706 (n1) (Lord Wright). See also Alphacell (n11) (Lord Salmon): ‘ordinary 
common sense’; Reeves (n11) 391 (Lord Hobhouse) ‘Virtually every event will have a number of 
antecedent facts which satisfy [the but-for] test. The ordinary use of language then distinguishes between 
them, choosing some and discarding others.’ 
20 eg Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause (Vernon 1927). See further Duxbury, Patterns of American 
Jurisprudence (Clarendon Press 1995) ch2; Stapleton, ‘Causation in the Law’ in Helen Beebee, Christopher 
Hitchcock and Peter Menzies (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Causation (OUP 2009) 754-756. 




references to common sense as ‘an empty slogan’,21 ‘vacuous camouflage’,22 and ‘so 
indeterminate that it is effectively worthless as an analytical guide’.23 She argues that ‘It brings 
the law into disrepute if, when confronted with a hotly disputed complex dispute about the 
appropriate point at which legal liability should be truncated, a court accepts the “glib 
submission” that its resolution rests on nothing much more than “common sense”.’24 
B. Hart	and	Honoré’s	Theory	
In Causation in the Law, Hart and Honoré acknowledged the imprecision and indeterminacy of 
judicial references to common sense, but argued that this should not lead legal scholars to 
dismiss such reasoning altogether. Instead, they speculated that judges might be relying on the 
same principles that affected ordinary people’s causal judgements outside the law; it was in this 
particular respect that judges might express their reasoning as a matter of ‘common sense’. Hart 
and Honoré’s approach involved two steps:25 first, they sought to identify commonsense 
principles of causal reasoning, by analysing how people used causation in ordinary language;26 
second, they sought to establish whether the same principles explained judicial decisions on 
legal causation, by examining legal judgments from across criminal and private law.27 Hart and 
                                                             
21 Stapleton (n5) 331. 
22 Ibid 353. 
23 Ibid 350. See also Wright, ‘The Nightmare and the Noble Dream: Hart and Honoré on Causation and 
Responsibility’ in Matthew Kramer and others (eds), The Legacy of HLA Hart: Legal, Political, and Moral 
Philosophy (OUP 2008) 170. 
24 Stapleton (n5) 334. Burrows similarly criticises that ‘unarticulated common sense or instinct is hardly a 
satisfactory basis for legal decision-making’: Burrows, Remedies for Torts and Breach of Contract (3rd edn, 
OUP 2004) 97. See also McGregor, McGregor on Damages (19th edn, Sweet & Maxwell 2014) [8-009]. 
25 Hart and Honoré 1: ‘two related main objectives’. This bifurcated approach is also identified in 
Stapleton, ‘Law, Causation and Common Sense’ (1988) 8 OJLS 111, 112 and Lipton, ‘Causation Outside the 
Law’ in Hyman Gross and Ross Harrison (eds), Jurisprudence: Cambridge Essays (OUP 1992) 127. 
26 Hart and Honoré ch2 (Causation and Common Sense). 
27 Ibid especially ch6 (Tort), ch11 (Contract) and ch12 (Crime). 




Honoré’s aim was thus to specify principles of causal reasoning outside the law for the purpose 
of illuminating commonsense reasoning within the law.28 
Hart and Honoré’s first conclusion was that ‘common sense is not a matter of inexplicable or 
arbitrary assertions’, and could instead be shown to rest on statable principles.29 They identified 
that outside the law, the ‘central notion’30 of cause is ‘essentially something which interferes 
with or intervenes in the course of events which would normally take place’.31 When ordinary 
people pick out ‘the cause’ from a range of counterfactually necessary conditions (but-for 
causes), they do so based on its ‘departure from the normal, ordinary, or reasonably expected 
course of events’.32 More specifically, Hart and Honoré identified two main commonsense 
principles affecting ordinary people’s central notion of causation:33 first, ‘the contrast between 
what is abnormal and normal in relation to any given thing or subject-matter’;34 and second, the 
contrast ‘between a free deliberate human action and all other conditions.35 In this article, I call 
these two principles the ‘abnormality’ principle and the ‘choice’ principle respectively. 
To illustrate the effect of the abnormality and choice principles in causal reasoning outside the 
law, Hart and Honoré gave the following example, concerning the outbreak of a fire: 
In most cases where a fire has broken out … the plain man would refuse to say that 
the cause of the fire was the presence of oxygen, though no fire would have 
occurred without it: [he] would reserve the title of cause for something of the order 
of a short-circuit, the dropping of a lighted cigarette, or lightning.36  
                                                             
28 Lipton (n25). 
29 Hart and Honoré 26. 
30 Ibid 28-44. This article focuses on the central notion and does not address the other notions relating to 
‘interpersonal transactions’ (see further 51-59) or ‘opportunities’ (see further 59-60). 
31 Ibid 29. See also Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (Hart 1999) 6. 
32 Hart and Honoré 33.  
33 These principles may overlap because voluntary conduct can sometimes also qualify as the cause by 
virtue of its abnormality: see further ibid 41, 136, 182-185, 335-336. 
34 Ibid 33. 
35 Ibid 33. 
36 Ibid 11.  




The short-circuit and the lightning strike both reflect the abnormality principle, and the 
dropped cigarette reflects the choice principle. In this example, the purpose of the plain man’s 
inquiry could be either explanatory or attributive.37 Causal explanations respond to the initial 
puzzle of why something happened; they call for further facts before the cause can be 
identified.38 Take, for example, the early stages of a police inquiry or a crash investigation. By 
contrast, causal attributions involve selecting the cause from amongst the range of necessary 
conditions (such as the oxygen in the air) for the purpose of assigning responsibility.39 Hart and 
Honoré pointed out that lawyers and legal decisions are usually concerned with causal 
attributions rather than with explanations,40 but they argued that both types of inquiry rely on 
the same principles.41 
In relation to the abnormality principle, Hart and Honoré identified that ‘what is abnormal … is 
what “makes the difference” between the accident and things going on as usual’.42 They 
emphasised that ‘what is normal and what is abnormal is, however, relative to the context’.43 To 
illustrate this point, they gave an example of a fire breaking out in a laboratory where special 
precautions were normally taken to exclude oxygen; here, one might well say that the presence 
of oxygen was the cause of the fire.44 They also emphasised that normality ‘is very often an 
artefact of human habit, custom, or convention’.45 In other words, what is abnormal may depend 
on social as well as physical factors. Furthermore, the cause need not be an ‘event’, in that it 
might equally consist of an absence, or a static condition. For example, ‘the lack of rain was the 
                                                             
37 Although this example initially features in the discussion of explanations, the same example is repeated 
in relation to attributions: see ibid 71-74. 
38 Ibid 23-24. See further 32-51. 
39 Ibid 24. See further ch3. 
40 Ibid 24. 
41 Ibid ch3, especially 68-70, 73. 
42 Ibid 35. 
43 Ibid 35. 
44 Ibid 35. 
45 Ibid 37. 




cause of the failure of the corn crop; the icy condition of the road was the cause of the 
accident’.46 
In relation to the choice principle, Hart and Honoré identified that ‘a voluntary human action 
intended to bring about what in fact happens … has a special place in causal inquiries’.47 In 
particular, ‘the free deliberate and informed act or omission of a human being, intended to 
exploit the situation created by [an earlier event], negatives causal connection’.48 Importantly, 
such action could be regarded as the cause even though it was both natural and probable;49 the 
choice principle was accordingly distinct from the abnormality principle. Hart and Honoré 
rejected the view that omissions could not be considered causes.50 For example, ‘someone's 
failure to wrap up is commonly and intelligibly taken to be the cause of his catching cold, and 
driving in the dark without lights to be the cause of an accident’.51 The reason is that these 
omissions represent ‘an abnormal failure of a normal condition’ under which the harm would 
not have occurred.52 
Having specified these two main commonsense principles, Hart and Honoré proceeded to re-
examine the judicial decisions on legal causation. They argued that numerous cases spanning 
tort, contract and criminal law, were ‘consistent with the view that the courts, whether 
consciously or unconsciously, apply the [commonsense] causal criteria analysed in the first part 
of our book.’53 In other words, it appeared that the judicial approach to legal causation was 
influenced by the same principles as those affecting ordinary people’s causal judgements 
outside the law. On this basis, Hart and Honoré famously concluded that ‘it is the plain man’s 
                                                             
46 Ibid 31. 
47 Ibid 42. 
48 Ibid 136. 
49 Ibid 158. 
50 Ibid 139. See also Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (n31) 12. 
51 Hart and Honoré 50. 
52 Ibid 40. 
53 Ibid xxxv. 




notions of causation (and not the philosopher’s or the scientist’s) with which the law is 
concerned’.54 Hart and Honoré did not deny that issues of legal policy also played some role in 
judicial decisions on legal causation;55 however, they considered that it was a ‘blinding error’56 
to dismiss all causal reasoning beyond the but-for test as ‘a mere disguise for arbitrary decision 
or judicial policy’.57 
C. Evaluating	Criticisms	
Hart and Honoré’s commonsense theory of legal causation has been criticised by legal scholars 
on several grounds,58 and has fallen almost entirely out of favour within contemporary legal 
scholarship.59 In this section, I evaluate three main strands of criticism. The first two strands 
correspond with each of the two steps in Hart and Honoré’s approach outlined above, namely 
their attempt to specify commonsense principles of causal reasoning outside the law, and their 
legal analysis of the decided cases. The third strand concerns two further criticisms that I argue 
are misplaced, because they mistake the purpose, or at least the surviving contribution, of Hart 
and Honoré’s theory. In my view, their theory survives as an attempt to explain (without 
justifying) the judicial approach to legal causation, and their inquiry into commonsense 
principles of causal reasoning should be understood as a first step in service of that aim. 
The first strand of criticism concerns the commonsense principles that Hart and Honoré 
identified.60 These principles involved empirical claims about how ordinary people make causal 
                                                             
54 Ibid 1. 
55 See further text to n79 below. 
56 Hart and Honoré 3; see also 26. 
57 Ibid 3. See further xxxv, 3-5, 88-108. 
58 For overviews, see Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25); Howarth, ‘Book Review’ 
(1987) 96 Yale Law Journal 1389. 
59 For a rare defence, see Lucy, Philosophy of Private Law (OUP 2007) ch5, 163-204. 
60 See generally Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 123-125; Howarth (n58) 1402-
1407; Wright (n23) 170-175. 




judgements outside the law.61 The problem was with their method, which relied solely on their 
own observations about the use of ordinary language. It exposed their theory to the obvious 
criticism that the ‘commonsense’ principles they identified were really based on their own 
idiosyncratic (or even ‘legalistic’) use of language.62 For this reason, Stapleton criticised that 
although ‘the reader will often find the assertions easy to accept … the technique is deceptive’.63 
This methodological flaw meant that the abnormality and choice principles could easily be 
dismissed as ‘merely an artefact derived from how lawyers used causal words, which [Hart and 
Honoré] asserted was the same way that ordinary people used them’.64 
Legal scholars are correct that the commonsense principles identified by Hart and Honoré were 
established more by ‘assertion rather than evidence’.65 However, attempts to contradict these 
principles have suffered from precisely the same evidential deficit. For example, Stapleton 
criticises Hart and Honoré’s definition of voluntary human conduct as ‘a remarkable departure 
from ordinary usage’,66 even suggesting that ‘the definition of “voluntary” is narrowed from its 
ordinary meaning in order to fit the cases’,67 but does not offer any empirical evidence of her 
                                                             
61 Lloyd-Bostock, ‘The Ordinary Man and the Psychology of Attributing Causes and Responsibility’ (1979) 
42 MLR 143, 144-145, 167. 
62 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Hart 2002) 129; Stapleton (n5) 334. See also Howarth (n58) 
1403, who criticised Hart and Honoré’s ‘claim to be reporting on ordinary usages in languages of which 
they are not native speakers, such as German and American’. 
63 Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 123. See also Howarth (n58) 1402: ‘The most 
obvious, but also the most fundamental, way of attacking Hart and Honoré is to question their method.’; 
Lloyd-Bostock (n61) 148: ‘any individual intuition will be a compound of several influences and effects 
which one cannot begin to disentangle without some form of sampling.’ 
64 Stapleton, Causation in the Law (n20) 756. See also Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' 
(n25) 123; Stapleton, 'Choosing what we mean by 'Causation' in the Law' (n3), 459. 
65 Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (n62) 129. See also Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common 
Sense' (n25) 123; Stapleton, Causation in the Law (n20) 756; Stapleton, 'Choosing what we mean by 
'Causation' in the Law' (n3) 462. Cf Lucy (n59) 200: ‘it would seem that any competent user of the 
language is well equipped to make judgments about ordinary use and common sense. If Hart and Honoré 
qualify as such, then their views are surely worthy of consideration.’ 
66 Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 125. See also Howarth (n58) 1399: ‘the terms 
"voluntary" and "coincidental" are defined technically, without much attention to ordinary usage’; Wright 
(n23) 173: ‘these supposed causal principles are not supported by the ordinary use of causal language.’ 
67 Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 125. 




own for this assertion.68 Other counterexamples developed by legal scholars are similarly based 
on their individual intuitions, rather than any reliable empirical research.69 
The second strand of criticism concerns Hart and Honoré’s analysis of the case law.70 These 
criticisms allege that the abnormality and choice principles cannot explain the judicial approach 
to legal causation because they are inconsistent with the reasoning and results of the decided 
cases in various respects.71 To evaluate these criticisms of Hart and Honoré’s theory would 
require a comprehensive analysis of cases across criminal and private law, which is beyond the 
scope of this article.72 However, it is important to note that even Hart and Honoré’s staunchest 
critics have acknowledged that at least in some respects the abnormality and choice principles 
appear impressively consistent with the decided cases.73 The criticism is instead usually that 
these principles are not fully consistent with the cases because they omit the role of certain 
factors that cannot be accounted for by common sense.74 
The most often-cited criticism of Hart and Honoré’s legal analysis is that it underplays the role 
of ‘legal policy’ in judicial decisions on legal causation. Unfortunately, legal scholars have often 
been vague in defining what they mean by ‘legal policy’ in this context.75 Legal policy might 
                                                             
68 See also Howarth (n58) 1403, who asserts (similarly without any empirical evidence of his own) that ‘if 
one really listened to ordinary speech, both in and out of the law, one would hear causal theories very 
different from the ones expounded by Hart and Honoré’. 
69 Lucy (n59) 200-201. See eg Stapleton, Causation in the Law (n20) 758; Stapleton, 'Choosing what we 
mean by 'Causation' in the Law' (n3) 462; Lipton (n25). 
70 See generally Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 126-128, although the cases 
discussed in this section concern ‘factual’ rather than legal causation. 
71 eg Stapleton, 'Choosing what we mean by 'Causation' in the Law' (n3) 462-463, citing Home Office v 
Dorset Yacht Co Ltd [1970] AC 1004 (HL) 1027-1028. 
72 See further text to n179 below. 
73 Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 116-117. See also Environment Agency v Empress 
Car Co (Abertillery) Ltd [1999] 2 AC 22 (HL) 30 (Lord Hoffmann): ‘In answering questions of causation for 
the purposes of holding someone responsible, both the law and common sense normally attach great 
significance to deliberate human acts and extraordinary natural events.’ 
74 See eg text to n140 below. 
75 Lucy (n59) 184-185. See further 164 fn33: ‘For realist-influenced causal minimalists, “policy 
considerations” seem to refer most often, and completely unhelpfully, to considerations judges might 
regard as relevant in arriving at decisions; no general statement of the properties these considerations 
 




mean the institutional values and purposes of the law,76 or it might involve (instead or 
additionally) a moral appraisal of the parties’ conduct and character.77 Hart and Honoré denied 
that either of these types of consideration featured within commonsense causal reasoning 
outside the law.78 However, they readily acknowledged that legal policy in the first sense did 
play some role in judicial decisions on legal causation.79 Hart and Honoré’s argument was 
simply that commonsense principles played some role as well;80 it is this relatively modest claim 
that opponents of their commonsense theory of legal causation nevertheless reject. 
The third strand concerns two criticisms that are, in my view, misplaced. First, Hart and 
Honoré’s theory has sometimes been criticised for failing to determine, or for being inconsistent 
with, the philosophical concept of causation.81 It is easy to see why Causation in the Law might 
be read in this way, because in Hart and Honoré’s own words, the First Edition of their book 
(published in 1959) ‘drew on the philosophical currents of the fifties [when] analysis of 
ordinary language was regarded by many as the key to the clarification of conceptual 
difficulties.’82 However, by the time the Second Edition was published in 1985, ordinary 
language philosophy had faded almost to extinction.83 Instead, prominent philosophers like 
Lewis and Mackie proceeded on the basis that the concept of causation could not be determined 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
have in common is ever forthcoming.’ See eg Stapleton, 'Cause in Fact' (n3) 421, referring (without 
further definition) to ‘normative “policy” reasons’. 
76 Lucy (n59) 185.  
77 Ibid 185-186. See further the examples cited at 186 fn75. 
78 On moral appraisals, see further text to n198 below. 
79 Hart and Honoré 304-307. Hart and Honoré summarised their position as ‘reject[ing] causal 
minimalism without embracing causal maximalism’: xxxv. See also Honoré, Responsibility and Fault (n31) 
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which the courts see the issues before them, and to which they seek analogies’. 
81 See eg Hancock, ‘Books Reviewed’ (1961) 6 The American Journal of Jurisprudence 143, 146-150; 
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by what people think it is,84 reflecting the causal realist view that ‘causal relations depend 
completely on a substructure of mind-independent relations’.85 
In their Second Edition, Hart and Honoré sought to clarify that the decline of ordinary language 
philosophy ‘does not show that our use of the methods of linguistic philosophy was 
inappropriate for our purpose’, because ‘courts have continually claimed that it is the ordinary 
man's conception of cause that is used by the law’.86 Accordingly, whatever may have been their 
initial aims, in the Second Edition they refocused their analysis of ordinary language exclusively 
as a tool for explaining judicial references to common sense. Stapleton is thus correct to 
conclude that ‘Theirs was not a metaphysical account’.87 In any case, within criminal and private 
law, the purpose of the causal inquiry is not to identify abstract relations, but rather to attribute 
responsibility for a specific event to a specific person; consequently, there is no reason to 
assume that the judicial approach to causation does or should match those of philosophical 
inquiries.88 
Second, Causation in the Law has often been read as an attempt to provide a normative 
justification of the judicial approach to legal causation. For example, Howarth asserts that 
‘despite the occasional protestation that their business is not to manipulate but to understand 
                                                             
84 Lewis, Counterfactuals (n16); Mackie, The Cement of the Universe: A Study of Causation (OUP 1974). See 
further Clarke and others, ‘Causation, Norms, and Omissions: A Study of Causal Judgments’ (2015) 28 
Philosophical Psychology 279, 290-292.  
85 Menzies, ‘Causation in Context’ in Price and Corry (eds), Causation, Physics, and the Constitution of 
Reality (OUP 2007) 193. Cf Hume, who insisted that causation is a psychological construct or ‘feeling’ 
rather than an external reality: Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature Part III, ch14. 
86 Hart and Honoré xxxiv. 
87 Stapleton, 'Choosing what we mean by 'Causation' in the Law' (n3) 459. See also Lucy (n59) 201: ‘Since 
Hart and Honoré did not aim to offer a metaphysically ‘deep’ account of causation … the fact that their 
account lacks metaphysical depth seems irrelevant.’ 
88 See further Green, Causation in Negligence (n7) ch1; Stapleton, Causation in the Law (n20) 749-753. In 
this article, I make no claims about the philosophical concept of causation. In particular, my use of causal 
terminology is intended merely to reflect the internal viewpoints of judges and ordinary people about 
which relations are ‘causal’, irrespective of whether philosophers would agree. 




causal notions, Causation in the Law's authors are advocates, not sociologists.’89 Stapleton 
presents their work as contributing to ‘the complex debate about which theory of “legal 
causation” is more attractive in principle’, not just ‘most effective in explaining the case law’.90 
Moore describes the book as ‘the first sustained effort to justify the legal doctrines of 
intervening causation.’91 Although in some parts of Causation in the Law Hart and Honoré 
formulated their aims in ways that invited confusion,92 overall it is implausible to read their 
work as offering a normative theory of legal causation, for two main reasons. 
First, if Hart and Honoré’s aim was to justify the law, their argument was obviously incomplete. 
To move from the descriptive observation that ordinary people make causal judgements using 
certain principles, to the normative claim that judges should rely on the same principles to 
determine legal liability, would require further normative premises that are not defended in the 
book.93 It would be surprising if Hart and Honoré made this basic mistake. Second, Hart and 
Honoré emphasised that ‘It may, of course, well be that when we thoroughly understand the 
commonsense notions of causation we should no longer wish our thought on any matters, let 
alone legal judgments of responsibility, to be dominated by them’.94 Their theory thus expressly 
left open that the commonsense judicial approach to legal causation may be unjustified. 
Whatever the scope of Hart and Honoré’s own aims, in my view their theory survives as an 
attempt to explain (without justifying) judicial reasoning.95 In particular, I take their theory as 
                                                             
89 Howarth (n58) 1404. See also 1402, where Howarth reads Hart and Honoré as claiming that ‘ordinary 
usage is to be the measure of right and wrong’. 
90 Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common Sense' (n25) 131 (emphasis added). Stapleton considered that 
her own theory of legal causation both explained and justified the law: see 115. 
91 Moore (n81) 852. See also Wright (n23) 166-167. 
92 See eg Hart and Honoré xxxv, where the authors claim ‘to put a rational and critical foundation under 
the case law as it stands’ (emphasis added), which seems to suggest normative justification. 
93 cf Lucy (n59) 202, who adds the normative premise that ‘the law should, whenever possible, track 
common sense’. 
94 Hart and Honoré 1-2. See also ibid 132, where the authors describe their aim as ‘to understand rather 
than to manipulate the principles of legal responsibility’. 
95 Here, I assume a positivist distinction between descriptive and normative theory. 




an attempt to specify the factors affecting judicial decisions on legal causation, for better or 
worse.96 I agree with their starting-point that legal scholars should take the judges’ references 
to common sense seriously. To this end, I maintain that their attempt to specify commonsense 
principles of causal reasoning was worthwhile. I recognise that the method they chose for this 
purpose was flawed, and casts legitimate doubt on the principles that they identified. 
Nevertheless, it is premature to dismiss the commonsense theory altogether. Instead, we should 
aim to specify these commonsense principles with greater reliability and precision; only then 
can we determine whether judicial decisions on legal causation are, or are not, affected by them. 
3. The	New	Commonsense	Theory	
In this part I develop a new commonsense theory of legal causation that draws on empirical 
evidence from experimental psychology to refine the principles identified by Hart and Honoré. 
Whereas Hart and Honoré sought to identify commonsense principles of causal reasoning using 
only their own intuitions about the use of ordinary language, experimental psychologists have 
since specified these principles more reliably and with greater precision. I show that the 
principles of abnormality and choice that Hart and Honoré identified are empirically well-
founded, but also that these principles need to be refined in crucial respects. These new insights 
into commonsense causal reasoning are entirely absent from contemporary critiques of Hart 
and Honoré’s work,97 and yet they provide the foundations for a revival of their approach. 
A. A	Primer	on	Experimental	Psychology	
Experimental psychologists use the term ‘causal selection’ to refer to the well-established 
observation that ‘in situations in which several factors contribute to an outcome, people often 
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97 As experimental psychologists have observed of legal scholarship, ‘Often missing from this debate is a 
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‘Causation in Legal and Moral Reasoning’ in Michael Waldmann (ed), The Oxford Handbook of Causal 
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select one over the other factors and name it “the cause”’.98 To investigate this phenomenon, 
experimental psychologists devise hypothetical scenarios (‘vignettes’) that are presented to 
participants under experimental conditions. These experiments typically require participants to 
attribute responsibility for an event to an individual human agent.99 By manipulating variables 
such as the content of the vignette, researchers can test how participants’ causal judgements are 
affected. In this way, experimental psychology aims to identify the specific factors or ‘cognitive 
principles’ that affect causal selection by ordinary people. 
The empirical research into causal selection thus serves the same aim as Hart and Honoré’s 
linguistic analysis. In Causation in the Law, Hart and Honoré’s focus on ordinary language was 
not an end in itself, but rather the (flawed) method that they used to try to identify the cognitive 
principles affecting the causal reasoning of ordinary people.100 As Gardner emphasises, in 
Causation in the Law ‘Words play a supporting, mainly illustrative, role’.101 The key difference 
within experimental psychology is its much-improved methodology. Although most 
experimental studies of causal selection rely to some extent on participants’ use of the word 
‘cause’,102 they ensure randomisation and control of variables, an appropriate sample size, and 
scrutiny of the vignette and question designs. These methods offer far greater reliability and 
precision than Hart and Honoré’s intuitive approach. 
                                                             
98 Samland and Waldmann, ‘How Prescriptive Norms Influence Causal Inferences’ (2016) 156 Cognition 
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study of the mind. 
99 Lagnado and Gerstenberg, Causation in Legal and Moral Reasoning 574. For an example of a vignette 
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Some of the earliest experiments into causal selection drew hypotheses directly from Hart and 
Honoré’s work;103 other studies emerged independently.104 What started as a trickle of 
experiments in the late 1980s,105 developed into a steady stream through the 1990s and 2000s, 
and has become a flood in the 2010s.106 Whereas empirical research into causal selection was 
still in its infancy at the time when Hart and Honoré’s Second Edition of Causation in the Law 
was published in 1985,107 it is now a vast, and still-growing, field. However, legal scholars 
continue to treat Hart and Honoré’s linguistic analysis as if it was the only extant attempt to 
specify commonsense principles of causal reasoning. This oversight is all the more remarkable 
given that many of the relevant empirical studies refer directly to Hart and Honoré’s work and 
set out explicitly to test the principles that they proposed.108 
Two main issues arise for legal scholars seeking to utilise this new empirical research. The first 
concerns the internal validity of the research: how successful are the experiments at testing 
what they claim to test, namely the cognitive principles that affect causal selection by ordinary 
                                                             
103 Hesslow, ‘The Problem of Causal Selection’ in Denis Hilton (ed), Contemporary Science and Natural 
Explanations: Commonsense Conceptions of Causality (New York University Press 1988); Cheng and 
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104 See eg Kahneman and Tversky, ‘The Simulation Heuristic’ in Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky (eds), 
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64 Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 897. 
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107 See further Jaspars, ‘The Process of Attribution in Common Sense’ in M R C Hewstone (ed), Attribution 
Theory: Social and Functional Extensions (Blackwell 1983). Cf Stapleton, 'Law, Causation and Common 
Sense' (n25) 123, citing Lloyd-Bostock (n61). 
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people?109 The published studies within experimental psychology focus extensively on this 
question. For example, recent research has responded to: the risk of ‘priming’;110 the concern 
that participants’ unreflective responses may differ from their more considered causal 
judgements;111 and the issue of ‘conversational pragmatics’.112 An evaluation of each of these 
issues is beyond the scope of this article; here, I merely note that experimental psychologists are 
keenly aware of these potential pitfalls and have sought to develop their experiment designs 
accordingly. 
The second issue for legal scholars is one of external validity: how generalisable are the results 
of the experiments to the context of interest? In other areas of empirical legal scholarship, such 
as in mock jury research, this issue can raise difficult problems because there the aim is to 
replicate (as closely as possible) the judicial context.113 However, that is not my aim in this 
article. Instead, I am investigating how ordinary people make causal judgements because in 
decisions on legal causation the judges themselves claim to be applying common sense. 
Furthermore, my aim is not to reach final conclusions about the principles that affect judicial 
reasoning, but rather to generate plausible hypotheses for legal scholars to use in re-examining 
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the case law.114 Consequently, for present purposes, it does not matter that the experimental 
context differs somewhat from the judicial context; my point is that the experiments plausibly 
match the context that judges have in mind when they invoke common sense.115 
Hart and Honoré shared this motivation for investigating commonsense principles of causal 
reasoning. As they put it, ‘the clarification of the structure of ordinary causal statements was 
and is an indispensable first step towards understanding the use of causal notions in the law’ 
because ‘courts have continually claimed that it is the ordinary man's conception of cause that is 
used by the law’.116 Even Hart and Honoré’s critics accepted this starting-point. For example, 
Stapleton acknowledges that their approach ‘made obvious sense as a first step in the 
consideration of causation in the law—and still does despite the relative eclipse of linguistic 
philosophy—because courts often assert that it is the ordinary person's concept of causation 
which is to be applied’.117 Instead, critics mostly doubted Hart and Honoré’s methodology;118 
here, the research within experimental psychology marks an important advance. 
B. What	Hart	and	Honoré	Got	Right	
In this section, I use the empirical research into causal selection to reassess the two main 
commonsense principles that Hart and Honoré identified. I show that there is now strong 
evidence to support Hart and Honoré’s claims that ordinary people select abnormal events and 
voluntary human conduct as causes of an event, instead of other conditions that were also 
necessary (in a but-for sense) for the event to have occurred. In this respect, whilst Hart and 
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Honoré’s methods of linguistic analysis were flawed, their conclusions have now been 
corroborated using the more reliable methods of experimental psychology. 
In relation to the abnormality principle, psychologists Kahneman and Miller coined the term 
‘norm theory’ to describe the hypothesis that ‘an event is more likely to be undone by altering 
exceptional than routine aspects of the causal chain that led to it’.119 This insight followed from 
an earlier experiment in which participants were presented with a story where the subject ‘did 
not drive home by his regular route’ or ‘left the office earlier than usual’.120 Numerous studies 
have confirmed that people are more likely to attribute causal significance to descriptively 
abnormal events than to normal events, holding other factors constant.121 This research 
convincingly supports the conclusions that Hart and Honoré drew (intuitively) from their 
famous example concerning the outbreak of a fire, in which the lightning strike was 
descriptively abnormal, whereas the oxygen in the air was not.122 
In relation to the choice principle, the empirical research also supports Hart and Honoré’s claim 
that voluntary human conduct has a special place in causal selection outside the law.123 In 
particular, the evidence shows that people select voluntary human conduct over natural events 
as the cause of an outcome, even where both are abnormal. Much of the relevant research in this 
area has been inspired directly by Hart and Honoré’s work. For example, McClure and others 
devised an experiment using the following example taken from Causation in the Law: 
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A throws a lighted cigarette into the bracken which catches fire. Just as the flames 
are about to flicker out, B, who is not acting in concert with A, deliberately 
pours petrol on them. The fire spreads and burns down the forest.124 
Hart and Honoré claimed that in these circumstances the ‘intervention displaces the prior 
action's title to be called the cause’, whereas if a ‘light breeze’ had fanned the flames instead, 
people would trace causality back to the first person’s conduct rather than regard the breeze as 
the cause.125 When McClure and others tested these alternative scenarios under experimental 
conditions, their findings matched Hart and Honoré’s intuitions. In particular, participants rated 
the causal importance of the person fanning the flames higher than when the wind fanned the 
flames; likewise, they rated the causal importance of a person igniting the flames higher than 
when the flames were ignited by lightning.126 Subsequent studies have replicated the finding 
that voluntary causes are preferred to physical ones even where both kinds of cause produce 
the target effect with the same probability.127 
Experimental psychologists have also investigated the contrast between actions and omissions 
in commonsense causal reasoning. The judicial tendency to identify omissions as causes has 
sometimes been criticised by legal scholars, particularly by those who model their 
(philosophical) concept of causation on physical processes rather than on counterfactual 
relations.128 However, several recent empirical studies find that ordinary people (just like 
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judges) have no difficulty in selecting omissions as causes.129 Just as Hart and Honoré 
predicted,130 omissions are selected as causes where there was a corresponding norm to act.131 
In particular, ‘when an omission does not violate a norm … it will not be identified as a cause, 
and when it does violate a norm it will be identified as a cause.’132 Accordingly, commonsense 
reasoning about omissions appears to be a function of the abnormality principle rather than the 
choice principle, even where the omission also coincides with a voluntary choice not to act.133 
C. Refining	the	Abnormality	Principle	
In this section, I show that Hart and Honoré’s exposition of the abnormality principle needs to 
be refined in two crucial respects: first, whereas Hart and Honoré focused exclusively on events 
that were descriptively abnormal, experimental psychologists have shown that violations of 
prescriptive norms also affect commonsense causal reasoning; second, there is emerging 
evidence that for events involving moral norm violations, ordinary people’s causal judgements 
may be affected by independent judgements of blame. Before affirming or dismissing the theory 
that judicial decisions on legal causation are affected by commonsense principles of causal 
reasoning, it is important for legal scholars to take account of these new insights. 
Experimental psychologists have shown that commonsense causal reasoning is affected by both 
descriptive and prescriptive abnormality. Whereas descriptive (or ‘statistical’) norms concern 
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what usually happens, prescriptive norms concern what should happen.134 It is possible to 
violate a prescriptive norm without departing from any descriptive norm, or in other words, 
whilst acting statistically normally. For example, downloading pirated music violates legal 
norms relating to copyright and moral norms relating to theft, even if most people do it.135 To 
test the effect of prescriptive abnormality on causal selection, Knobe and Fraser devised an 
experiment in which participants were presented with the following ‘pen vignette’:136 
The receptionist in the philosophy department keeps her desk stocked with pens. 
The administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens, but faculty members are 
supposed to buy their own. The administrative assistants typically do take the pens. 
Unfortunately, so do the faculty members. The receptionist has repeatedly e-mailed 
them reminders that only administrative assistants are allowed to take the pens. On 
Monday morning, one of the administrative assistants encounters Professor Smith 
walking past the receptionist’s desk. Both take pens. Later that day, the receptionist 
needs to take an important message . . . but she has a problem. There are no pens 
left on her desk.137 
Here, the conduct of both protagonists is descriptively normal (they both usually take pens), but 
only Professor Smith’s conduct violates a prescriptive norm (to refrain from taking pens). 
Participants tended to agree strongly with the statement that Professor Smith caused the 
problem, but disagreed that the administrative assistant caused the problem.138 The finding that 
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prescriptive (including moral) norm violations affect causal selection even in the absence of 
descriptive abnormality, has been replicated in numerous other studies.139 
This new insight into commonsense causal reasoning provides a response to one of the main 
weaknesses of Hart and Honoré’s theory of legal causation. In her review of Causation in the 
Law, Stapleton pointed out that ‘in the context of many legal enquiries the law is concerned with 
departures not from normality, but from the mandated course of events’.140 For example, the 
defendant may be held as the legal cause of a harm even though their conduct only violated a 
legal, not descriptive, norm; similarly, the conduct of a third party may be elevated to the status 
of an intervening cause even though it was descriptively normal. These legal decisions did not 
seem to fit with Hart and Honoré’s exposition of the abnormality principle. Stapleton concluded 
that Hart and Honoré’s commonsense theory ‘has difficulty accommodating the fact that the law 
needs to and does identify normal departures from a mandated standard as “causes”’.141 
This was a valid criticism of Hart and Honoré’s theory. However, by drawing on the empirical 
research into causal selection, the new commonsense theory can accommodate it. The fact that 
judges recognise violations of prescriptive norms as the cause of a harm in deciding questions of 
legal causation does not (on its own) distinguish judicial reasoning from commonsense 
reasoning. This is because commonsense judgements of causal selection are also sensitive to 
violations of prescriptive norms: for example, the conduct of Professor Smith in the pen 
vignette.142 In this respect, the fact that judges often select a defendant’s or third party’s 
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departure from ‘the mandated course of events’ as the cause of an outcome (even though their 
conduct was descriptively normal) does not show that their causal reasoning must really be a 
disguise for distinct issues of legal policy such as the scope and purpose of the relevant legal 
rule. 
Recent empirical research also shows that ordinary people use descriptive and prescriptive 
cues together to generate a composite judgement of normality when making causal judgements. 
Bear and Knobe found that people generate ‘an undifferentiated representation of what is 
normal’ that is acquired through a process that integrates both statistical and moral learning 
and is neither purely descriptive nor purely prescriptive.143 It is well-established that people 
often use heuristics or ‘mental shortcuts’ to support complex cognitive tasks.144 In causal 
selection, it appears that people use descriptive and prescriptive norms as heuristics for one 
another, such that their (subconscious) application of the abnormality principle depends on a 
composite representation of normality that ‘is not specifically designed either for statistical 
purposes or for prescriptive purposes but which manages to do a fairly decent job in both 
domains’.145 
The second respect in which the abnormality principle needs to be refined concerns the role 
blame in causal selection. In relation to descriptive abnormality, there is consensus amongst 
experimental psychologists that descriptive norm violations impact the process of 
counterfactual reasoning by heightening the ‘availability’ of an imagined alternative in which 
the normal course of events transpired instead; this process in turn affects causal selection 
                                                             
143 Bear and Knobe, 'Normality: Part Descriptive, Part Prescriptive' (n110) 25-26. See also Hitchcock and 
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(‘availability theory’).146 However, in relation to moral norm violations, whereas some 
experimental psychologists conclude that immoral behaviour affects causal selection in the 
same way as descriptive abnormality (by heightening the availability of alternatives), there is 
emerging evidence to suggest that in these circumstances causal selection is affected by 
independent judgements of blame (‘blame theory’).147 
The difference between these two theories can be illustrated using the pen vignette outlined 
above.148 According to availability theory, participants judge Professor Smith’s conduct as the 
cause because the alternative world in which he does not take a pen is considered more 
‘available’ than the world in which the assistant does not take a pen; in turn this affects the 
process of counterfactual reasoning that drives the judgement of causal selection.149 By contrast, 
according to proponents of blame theory, the main reason why participants judge Professor 
Smith as the cause of the problem ‘surely must be that he is a depraved pen pilferer.’150 As 
Alicke and others put it, ‘In the realm of offensive or harmful human behavior, blame is the 
engine that makes norm violations matter.’151 This reverses the conventional view within 
cognitive science that judgements of blame depend on an antecedent judgement of causal 
responsibility.152 
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The original pen experiment conducted by Knobe and Fraser did not provide any way of testing 
between availability theory and blame theory, because both explanations were consistent with 
the observed effect whereby participants judged that Professor Smith caused the problem.153 A 
series of further experiments have since been conducted in an attempt to settle the explanation, 
but the debate remains ongoing.154 A very recent study contended that in relation to moral norm 
violations, judgements of causal selection may also be sensitive to mental state factors such as 
‘the agent’s intentionality, the foreseeability of the outcome, or the agent’s knowledge about the 
existence and applicability of a prescriptive norm’.155 It is currently too early to decide between 
each of these theories,156 but if blame theory is correct then it may have important implications 
for judicial reliance on commonsense causal reasoning.157 
D. Refining	the	Choice	Principle	
Empirical research into the choice principle is currently less developed than it is in relation to 
abnormality. Nevertheless, several studies provide new insights into Hart and Honoré’s claim 
that outside the law, human conduct is only accorded special causal significance where it is ‘free 
deliberate and informed’.158 Emerging research also promises to deepen our understanding of 
why voluntary human conduct affects causal selection, which may provide the key to further 
refinements in the scope of the choice principle. In this section, as well as outlining the 
contributions that experimental psychologists have already made, I highlight promising new 
frontiers in this area of research. As these and other aspects of causal reasoning begin to be 
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investigated by experimental psychologists, the new commonsense theory that I outline in this 
article can continue to be developed in greater detail.159 
The empirical evidence tends to support Hart and Honoré’s claim that in ordinary causal 
reasoning outside the law, a person’s conduct must be informed in order for it to be selected as 
the cause of an event.160 Hart and Honoré’s further claim that conduct must be ‘free’ has not yet 
been investigated by experimental psychologists. In particular, there have not yet been any 
empirical studies in which the actor’s voluntariness was constrained by pressures such as ‘the 
influence of panic’,161 or legal or moral obligations.162 This is an area that appears ripe for 
further research by experimental psychologists. Empirical evidence on the scope of 
voluntariness within ordinary causal reasoning could help to settle a widespread but 
empirically-unsubstantiated criticism of Hart and Honoré’s theory, namely that their claims 
about voluntariness were ‘a remarkable departure from ordinary usage’.163 
As regards the requirement of deliberateness, the empirical research interestingly mirrors an 
ambivalence in Hart and Honoré’s theory. In the First Edition of Causation in the Law, Hart and 
Honoré claimed that to count as voluntary, an act must be ‘intended to produce the consequence 
which is in fact produced’.164 However, in the Second Edition they recanted that ‘This was a 
mistake’.165 Instead, they revised that the actor need only treat the situation as ‘providing the 
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opportunity or occasion for a certain course of conduct’; the actual consequences need not have 
been intended.166 Several empirical studies have investigated the issue of intention as to 
consequences, but their findings so far appear contradictory.167 This complex aspect of the 
choice principle may become clearer in the near future, as new research promises to develop ‘a 
more fine-grained modelling of agents’ mental states’ as a factor in ordinary causal reasoning.168 
Finally, empirical research reveals that the choice principle may influence causal selection by 
affecting judgements of how likely the event would have been to occur even if other conditions 
had been different. This insight arises from evidence that ‘intentional actions are typically 
judged more robust than unintentional ones’.169 A causal relation is ‘robust’ when it would have 
held even if there had been variations to other conditions, whereas it is ‘sensitive’ if it relies on a 
fragile and improbable set of other conditions.170 Legal scholars have already suggested that the 
notion of sensitivity might help to explain the judicial approach to legal causation, particularly 
the significance of deliberate human intervention.171 However, this hypothesis is currently 
based only on individual intuitions about commonsense reasoning and could usefully be refined 
using experimental methods. 
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The new commonsense theory developed above is aimed at generating hypotheses for legal 
scholars to test by re-examining the cases on legal causation.172 At this stage, it is too early to 
say whether or not the law reflects the refined commonsense principles that I have outlined. 
Instead, my aim is to revive an approach that seems to have fallen out of favour amongst 
contemporary scholars of legal causation. As Lipton advocated before the advent of modern 
experimental psychology: ‘First we construct a good model of our ordinary notion of causation; 
then we may embark on the task of showing the extent to which causal judgments in the law fit 
the model.’173 In other words, before we can assess whether or not judges are correct in 
asserting that legal causation is a matter of ‘common sense’, we at least need to know, as reliably 
and precisely as possible, how ordinary people make causal judgements. 
This two-stage approach underpinned Hart and Honoré’s theory in Causation in the Law,174 and 
in my view, it remains a sensible strategy for legal scholars to pursue. Against this approach, 
critics of the commonsense theory of legal causation have argued that ‘the biggest payoff of … 
abandoning the slogan of “common sense causation” is that we can get to work on 
understanding what principles, policies and concerns govern the scope issue.’175 This conclusion 
seems premature. It appears to be driven by the widespread assumption of legal scholars that 
the variety and complexity of concerns at play in judicial decisions on legal causation cannot 
possibly be accounted for by common sense.176 My aim is to dislodge that assumption. I think it 
is worth renewing attempts to specify commonsense principles of causal reasoning, rather than 
rejecting the commonsense theory of legal causation altogether. 
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The empirical evidence that I have outlined shows that principles of commonsense causal 
reasoning can be specified: common sense is not so indeterminate as to be ‘effectively worthless 
as an analytical guide’.177 This evidence also shows that the principles of abnormality and choice 
are more rich and multifaceted than legal scholars (including Hart and Honoré) have previously 
appreciated. However, in my view this insight makes it more likely that common sense will 
eventually prove capable of explaining some aspects of the judicial approach to legal 
causation.178 By synthesising the relevant empirical evidence to date, my aim is to provide an 
initial platform for legal scholars to use in re-examining the cases on legal causation. But as the 
work of experimental psychologists in this field continues to advance at a rapid pace, these 
hypotheses have the potential to be developed further. 
It is beyond the scope of this article to test the extent to which judicial decisions on legal 
causation are consistent with the hypotheses that I have generated. In Causation in the Law, 
Hart and Honoré devoted three full chapters to this purpose: one each on tort, contract and 
criminal law.179 The number of relevant cases in English law alone is vast; it would inevitably be 
partial for me to select individual decisions (or famous hypotheticals) that appear to be 
explained by reference to the specific principles that I have identified. A fuller analysis is 
required, but is a task for another occasion. It may be that when this task is performed, legal 
scholars will conclude that the commonsense principles identified by experimental 
psychologists are inconsistent with the reasoning and results of judicial decisions on legal 
causation. I leave that possibility open. My aim in the next part is to show that it is worth finding 
out, one way or the other. 
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If judicial decisions on legal causation do reflect (to some extent) the commonsense principles 
that I have specified, several implications follow. For judges, the empirical research can then be 
used to help articulate their current commonsense approach in more detail. In some cases, it 
may also show that judges need to change their approach to avoid influence by factors that 
would widely be regarded as improper grounds for determining legal liability. For legal 
scholars, the insights from experimental psychology show that certain prominent criticisms of 
Hart and Honoré’s theory must now be abandoned, or at least modified. They also show that the 
main dividing line between the commonsense theory and rival explanations of legal causation 
needs to be redrawn, and the debate reframed. 
A. For	Judicial	Practice	
If the new commonsense theory is correct, the empirical research into causal selection can be 
used to help judges specify their current approach in more detail.180 At present, judges are often 
able to state only the broad genus of their reasoning (‘common sense’); beyond this, they have 
struggled to specify any reasons for their decisions. This form of judging is obviously 
unsatisfactory in several respects;181 it has rightly been criticised both by legal scholars and 
occasionally by senior judiciary.182 Most fundamentally, the common law doctrine of precedent 
arose from and continues to depend on the judicial practice of giving reasons.183 Stating only 
that a decision was matter of ‘common sense’ makes it impossible to tell which facts of the case, 
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if different, would have led to a different decision; the current judicial approach to legal 
causation thus stunts the very process by which the common law develops.184 
It should not come as a surprise that judges have so far struggled to identify for themselves the 
factors affecting their commonsense intuitions. Even though causal reasoning is ubiquitous in 
everyday life,185 ordinary people are notoriously bad at consciously identifying (let alone 
articulating) the factors affecting their own causal judgements.186 This lack of self-awareness in 
performing routine cognitive tasks is a well-known phenomenon within psychology 
generally,187 but is especially relevant to causal selection. That is why experimental 
psychologists devise experiments to test different hypotheses obliquely, rather than simply 
asking their participants to explain their causal judgements directly.188 Cognitive science has 
developed increasingly-sophisticated techniques for overcoming the problem that people often 
cannot consciously identify the factors affecting their judgements of causal selection. 
The empirical research into causal selection can therefore offer important help to judges by 
prompting them to consider consciously some of the factors known to affect commonsense 
causal reasoning. So, rather than stating baldly that their decision on legal causation is a matter 
of ‘common sense’ and nothing more, judges can begin to ask themselves, for example: did the 
relevant event involve the violation of a norm? Was it a descriptive or a prescriptive norm? Was 
the prescriptive norm moral or legal (or of another kind)? And so on. Of course, none of these 
prompts are determinative. On reflection, judges might hold that some of the factors affecting 
ordinary people’s judgements of causal selection should not be used in the doctrine of legal 
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causation; if so, judges can reject the relevance of these factors, supported by reasons. In this 
way the common law can develop, released from its present stalemate. 
In some cases, the empirical research into causal selection may also show that judges need to 
change their approach to avoid influence by factors that would widely be regarded as improper 
grounds for determining legal liability.189 First, ordinary people appear to rely on heuristics or 
‘mental shortcuts’ to generate the representations of normality that they use in causal 
selection.190 This shortcut may be expedient for most everyday tasks, where an unreflective 
causal judgement is sufficient and less time-consuming. But many would regard it as improper 
for judges to rely on the same rough-and-ready process when deciding issues of legal liability 
using their common sense. If so, once aware of this heuristic tendency, judges could instead 
develop the law by specifying expressly which type of norm violation (descriptive or 
prescriptive) they consider to be legally dispositive. 
Second, the experimental research shows that judgements of blame may affect commonsense 
causal reasoning. Hart and Honoré sought pre-emptively to deny this effect, asserting that ‘what 
is selected as the cause from the total set of conditions will often … coincide with what is 
reprehensible by established standards of behaviour … [but] this does not justify the conclusion 
which some have drawn that it is so selected merely because it is reprehensible’.191 By contrast, 
experimental psychologists have shown that when ordinary people are faced with 
‘reprehensible’ behaviour, their judgement of causal selection may be affected by an 
independent judgement of blame.192 Importantly, in the experiments that appear to support 
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blame theory, participants are not aware of this effect on their causal reasoning, even though 
researchers can demonstrate it obliquely; it operates entirely subconsciously. 
The appropriate role of blame in determining legal liability is complex, and I do not seek to draw 
any firm conclusions here. However, if judgements of blame subconsciously affect causal 
selection, there is a risk that such judgements may inadvertently incorporate various biases into 
legal decision-making, concerning the parties’ backgrounds, their prior conduct or convictions, 
their likeability in the witness box, and so on, that would widely be regarded as improper 
considerations.193 My point is that the empirical evidence on causal selection provides judges 
with provisional grounds for caution where their decisions on legal causation arise against a 
backdrop of significant moral norm violations. Where judges describe these decisions as a 
matter of ‘common sense’, they should be alive to the risk that their conclusions may 
subconsciously be affected by factors that they would consider, on reflection, ought to be 
discounted. 
B. For	Legal	Scholarship	
For legal scholars, the most obvious implication of the empirical research into causal selection is 
the need to abandon or modify certain prominent criticisms of Hart and Honoré’s original 
commonsense theory, so that the debate can move on. As I have acknowledged, legal scholars 
were justified in criticising Hart and Honoré’s theory as empirically unfounded at the time when 
the Second Edition was published in 1985.194 But legal scholars have continued (often 
vehemently) to criticise the validity of the abnormality and choice principles of commonsense 
causal reasoning, even within the past decade, when relevant evidence has been readily 
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available to support these principles.195 In light of this evidence, it is no longer tenable to 
dismiss common sense as merely ‘vacuous camouflage’.196 Critiques of the commonsense theory 
must now engage with the insights that experimental psychology provides. 
Secondly, the new commonsense theory that I have outlined shows that existing debates about 
legal causation need to be reframed. Although explanatory theories of legal causation have 
featured prominently in legal scholarship for almost a century, the debate’s main dividing line 
has remained essentially the same. It continues to be framed as a disagreement about whether 
the rules of legal causation reflect ‘common sense’ or (alternatively) ‘normative judgements’. 
This dividing line is traceable to the arguments of the early American legal realists in the 
1920s,197 and was unfortunately reinforced by Hart and Honoré in Causation in the Law, who 
incorrectly claimed that the commonsense principles they had identified raised only (non-
normative) ‘questions of fact’.198 The same assumption is evident in the work of Stapleton and 
Wright, encapsulated by Stapleton’s contemporary critique that legal causation ‘is not a 
question of fact or “common sense” but of normative judgment’.199 
I have shown that this contrast between common sense and normative judgements is a false 
dichotomy. The process of causal selection by ordinary people can and often does incorporate 
normative judgements.200 Ordinary people’s causal judgements are affected not only by 
descriptively abnormal events, but also by events that violate prescriptive norms, including 
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legal or moral norms, even where the violation was descriptively normal.201 Legal scholars have 
previously pointed out that commonsense causal reasoning may be ‘normative’ in the sense that 
it relies on shared ‘social rules’ for attributing responsibility.202 However, I go further in 
showing that causal selection can also depend on moral appraisals.203 The observation that 
judicial decisions on legal causation are affected by normative (including moral) judgements is 
thus entirely consistent with the proposition that judicial reasoning is based on common 
sense.204 
The dividing line between the commonsense theory and rival explanations of legal causation 
needs to be redrawn to accommodate this insight. It does not make sense to ask whether 
judicial reasoning is based either on common sense or on normative judgements. The 
appropriate question is instead whether the same types of normative judgement that affect 
ordinary people’s causal reasoning also affect judges’ commonsense reasoning. One of 
Stapleton’s most forceful criticisms of Hart and Honoré’s theory was that ‘appeals to “common 
sense causation” … obscure the task of identifying that it is this normative scope question that is 
in dispute.’205 But on the new commonsense theory (which departs from Hart and Honoré’s 
theory in acknowledging that commonsense causal reasoning does not only raise questions of 
fact), it is clear that normative issues arise on both sides of the traditional dividing line. 
Instead, I propose that the dividing line between the commonsense theory and rival 
explanations of legal causation should be redrawn as follows. On one side of the line are factors 
that affect both commonsense causal reasoning and judicial decisions on legal causation. On the 
other side are factors that affect only judicial decisions on legal causation. This latter set of 
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factors may then be said to raise issues of ‘legal policy’ in the specific sense that these factors 
uniquely apply to the attribution of legal responsibility, as administered by judges. Issues of this 
kind may include the purpose of the relevant legal rule and the nature of the relevant legal 
sanction. I do not doubt that issues of legal policy in this sense play some role in judicial 
decisions on legal causation; indeed, that role may be substantial.206 But it seems to me unlikely 
that all of the factors affecting judicial reasoning will end up falling on this side of the line, once 
we understand commonsense causal reasoning more fully. 
5. Conclusion	
I began with the observation that judges often invoke ‘common sense’ when deciding questions 
of legal causation. I have argued that legal scholars should take these references seriously; it is 
premature to dismiss judges’ commonsense reasoning as mistaken or misleading. The most 
appropriate response to doubts about the commonsense principles that Hart and Honoré 
identified is to search for new ways to specify those principles with greater reliability and 
precision; it is not to abandon their approach altogether. The new commonsense theory that I 
have outlined offers a platform for legal scholars to re-examine the case law on legal causation, 
drawing on insights from experimental psychology into how ordinary people make causal 
judgements. These hypotheses about the factors affecting judicial reasoning remain to be tested; 
my claim is that they are worth investigating. 
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